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Introduction 
This publication is directed to people, particularly in the shell egg industry, 
who would like more information on the delivery system of the shell egg 
futures contract. It should also interest those who would like some insights on 
the delivery system for agricultural commodity futures contracts, particularly 
those relating to perishable and unstable commodities. This includes shell 
eggs and frozen pork bellies as perishable commodities. The unstable type of 
commodities would include live beef cattle, hogs, and feeder cattle. The live 
commodities do not retain their status. As they grow older, they change in 
weight and quality, etc. , in contrast to grains that are stable, storable, and 
maintain a given quality over a long period of t ime. 
Futures trading first started with the storable commodities such as grains. 
In early futures theory, storability was one of the requirements for a com-
modity to be futures traded . In recent years this concept was changed, and 
more and more commodities of all types are traded in the futures. However, 
the concept of delivery and the assumed impact of deliveries is still based on 
the grains. There are different factors at work and different considerations 
for the futures deliveries of the unstable or perishable commodities which 
will be referred to simply as unstable commodities. 
Futures trading is forthe economic purpose of shifting risk for the hedger. 
The speculator enters the tradi ng arena and provides liquidity and takes the 
risk. Provision fordeliveriesare a necessary part of this futures trading system. 
The other purpose of this publication is to report a detailed survey of the 
deliveries under the fresh shell egg futures contracts with particular emphasis 
on the deliveries in 1970 and some discussion with reference to delivery 
procedures which have originated since that time. If this publication can lead 
to a better understanding of futures trading through a discussion of the 
deliveries, the purpose will have been served. 
Purpose of Delivery 
The futures contract consists of an agreement on the part of the seller to 
deliver a specific quantity and qualityofthe product in a specified month in the 
future and the buyer of a futures contract agrees to accept delivery of this 
product under such conditions. All contracts for a commodity for all months 
are alike in specifications and volume. 
As the sale is in the future, there is no requirement that the seller of the 
contract have the commodity in hand or even know where he might get it for 
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the delivery of the contract in the future and the buyer of such a contract for 
some future delivery does not have to have any provisions to receive the 
commodity. The seller who is known as a "short" in the trade, because 
he is making a sale for future deliveries of com mod ities which he may not have, 
and the buyer who is known as a "long," as he is due to receive the commodity 
at some future date, can buy or sell the contracts at any time. Either a 
long or a short can initiate a contract. So the futures market is in reality 
a market of these contracts and not of the commodities. l Actually no contracts 
are even issued but the commodity exchange rules state the agreements. Also 
there is no name associated with the opposite side of the trade. A trader does 
not trade with a specific other trader. The prices established in the futures 
market for the contracts for the future may give some indication of the evalua-
tion of what the price might be sometime in the future by people who are 
willing to buy and sell these contracts. This evaluation is far from accurate in 
many cases but it is often the only indication available . 
• Futures are not to buy or sell the commodity. It is generally accepted 
that buying and selling in the futures is not for the purpose of disposing 
of or obtaining the commodity but is a way of registering a viewpoint on 
what the supply and demand situation might be at that future time, or it 
represents a price at which a trader might now be willing to buy or sell that 
commodity for at the future date. As will be explained later, it is possible for a 
trader to assure himself, "lock in," the price of his production or purchases at 
the price at which he trades the future contract. Therefore, very few of the 
contracts traded are ultimately settled by delivery. 
So the object of the delivery provision of the futures contract which is a 
legal binding contract, is not to facilitate the delivery of the commodity or the 
purchase of the commodity, but the delivery provision is included to assure 
compliance with the contract. In other words, if a trader does not offset2 his 
position in the futures market by an offsetting transaction before the delivery 
month, he is required to deliver or receive the com mod ity. In reality the delivery 
provision is included in the futures contract to assure that appropriate action 
will be taken in reference to either offsetting the contract, or as an alternative, 
delivering or receiving the commOdity. 
The delivery provision also acts to force the futures prices and cash prices 
into a predictable relationship in the delivery months. The futures and cash 
prices are forced together or near together by traders delivering and waiting 
for delivery if the prices are apart. This is more apparent in the storable than in 
the non-storable commodities. 
Delivery Procedure 
In all futures trading the short makes the decision to deliver a commodity. 
The commodity can only be delivered during the month in which the contract 
matures. As an example, April eggs can only be delivered in the month of April 
and September eggs can only be delivered in the month of September. The 
short is required to deliver the quantity of the commodity which is specified by 
'The trading takes place and is regulated by a commodity exchange or board of trade. Those 
will be hereinafter referred to as an exchange. 
2To offset a contract is to make the opposite transaction of the original transaction thereby 
clearing the contract. If originally sold to buy back a contract or if original bought to sell a contract. 
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the contract. In eggs, he must deliver not more than 750 cases and not less 
than 720 cases. The quantity required for the delivery of the commodity is 
usually a unit in transportation, as an example, eggs are usually shipped via 
truck and a trailer load of eggs is between 720 to 750 cases. The commodity 
must be of the quality specified by the exchange. Usually a USDA grade is 
specified and the eggs must be graded by an official USDA grader within a 
specific number of days prior to delivery. This applies to practically all of the 
commodities that are delivered on exchanges. In other words, the quantity and 
the quality is clearly specified by the exchanges and a government grading 
source is used to certify the quality. The exchange rules specify the locations 
where the eggs can be made available. The short designates the delivery place. 
However, the new Western shell egg contract specifies that delivery shall be to 
the long's location with delivery arrangements made by the short. Delivery is 
accomplished at the exchange or board oftrade by presenting the proper type 
of certificate through the broker who represents the short. 
• Delivery on any business day of the delivery month. Delivery can be made 
on any trading day of the delivery month. Trading is usually from Monday 
through Friday morn ings to early afternoon. Trading closes for the deliverable 
contractfive to seven trading days priorto the end of the month. This is done to 
provide an opportunity to get all deliveries made without the confusion of 
trading. 
When the short delivers the eggs, he does not know to whom he is deliver-
ing the ownership of the eggs. The eggs are actually delivered to the oldest 
long, the person who holds the oldest purchase contract. This is determined 
by the Cleari ng House of the exchange where all of the records are kept. When 
the notice of delivery is received, the Clearing House looks through the rec-
ords, finds the oldest long of record, and notifies the broker representing that 
long that he has received a carload of eggs. The eggs are then the property of 
the long for his disposition and use. In some commodities it is possible to 
redeliver by selling a short contract and delivering the commodity again . 
• Longs can usually avoid getting delivery. The delivery procedure is such 
that a non-industry member speculator might get the commodity. This gives 
rise to the commonly asked question "what is the dentist in Boston going 
to do with 750 cases of eggs?" The long does not need to put himself 
into position of receiving eggs as he can offset his contract prior to the 
delivery month. Even within the delivery month the information is available 
to the brokers as to what date of long purchases the current deliveries 
are being made. The long can be informed by his broker of the likelihood of 
delivery being imminent for him. 
When the trading ceases for the current delivery month contract, all open 
contracts are settled by delivery by the end of the month. Anyone who is a long 
position will have to take eggs, and any short who has an open contract when 
trading ceases knows he will have to make delivery of the commodity before 
the end of the month. Violation of these rules by not making or taking delivery 
results in severe penalities not only for the trader but also for the broker 
involved. The penalty is severe enough that defaulting is extremely rare. 
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Shifting Risks 
The justification for futures trading on the exchanges is primarily to shift 
risk by the hedging procedure. Through hedging in futures trading, it is 
possible to determine the approximate net price that will be received for the 
commodity to be sold or what will be paid for the commodity to be purchased 
sometime in the future. This is possible because of the cash-futures price 
relationships that normally exist in the month the contract matures. Usually 
the futures and the cash price come relatively close together or together 
during this delivery month. 
The hedger is a price taker in that he takes the price that he can get when he 
places the contract on the market for price protection purposes. The price 
protection is supplied by the speculator who elects to trade because he thinks 
he can make some financial gain from market price changes. Therefore, the 
hedger provides trading contracts by placing on the market contracts to buy 
or sell at the market price. The speculator provides liquidity to the market by 
buying or selling these contracts. 
The theory of hedging and basis for hedging trading procedure requires an 
extensive elaboration and there are publications relating to this. Therefore, in 
the interest of time and space, this will not be discussed in this publication. 
Changes in Delivery Procedure 
There have been some changes over time in the delivery location of fresh 
shell eggs on the fresh shell egg futures contract. While there have been some 
quality changes, the primary change of concern in this publication relates to 
where the eggs can be delivered. 
Shell eggs have been traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for a 
number of years, but the era of fresh shell egg trading started with the March, 
1967 contract. Prior to this time cold storage eggs were delivered and the 
quality specifications were in terms of cold storage eggs. This contract was 
used primarily by egg products processors who then used older eggs. 
The delivery on the March, 1967 contract was in terms of fresh shell eggs. 
However, the delivery of cold storage eggs was permitted at a discount that 
discouraged the del ivery of cold storage eggs. Del ivery was at designated cold 
storage warehouses. The delivery of cold storage eggs at a discount was 
permitted from the beginning of the fresh shell egg contract in March, 1967 
through January, 1969 contract. The February, 1969 contract called for the 
delivery of fresh shell eggs only and these were delivered at cold storage 
warehouses. Then starting with the April, 1971 contract there was a major 
change as eggs were allowed to be delivered at either the approved cold 
storage warehouses or at approved egg packing plants. The dual location for 
deliveries remained into effect through the February 1972 contract. Beginning 
with the March, 1972 contract only delivery at approved egg packing plants 
was permitted. This rule remained in effect at the time of the writing of this 
bulletin. This has become known as in-plant delivery . 
• Specific delivery information. Table 1 gives the information relating to 
deliveries for the three different periods of deliveries under the fresh , shell egg 
contract. The open commitments is the number of contracts for the next 
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month open at the close of the last business day preceding the delivery or 
current month. Commitments in terms of carlots is the same as commitment 
in terms of contracts since each contract is the delivery of one carlot of eggs. 
The number of open commitments at the beginning of the contract month has 
stabilized for group two and three and is considerably lower than in group one. 
The deliveries are the original carlots of eggs delivered and not total 
deliveries in the case of groups one and two. Redelivery was permitted under 
group one and the total deliveries including redeliveries was 4,622 carlots on 
almost two and one-half times the number of original cars. The redelivery was 
at very little inconvenience to the trader as he merely sold a contract short and 
turned in the warehouse receipt. 
In group two period warehouse and in-plant deliveries was permitted and 
the warehouse eggs were readily redeliverable. In-plant redelivery was permit-
ted but this procedure consisted of transporting the eggs to a warehouse and 
having them reinspected which was almost the same as the original delivery. 
Group three period consisted of all in-plant deliveries and there was no provi-
sion for redelivery. 
Table 1 
Deliveries under Fresh Shell Egg Futures Contract 
During Three Periods of Different Delivery 
Procedure 
Group I Group II 
2/69 4/71 
through through 
3/71 2/72 
Open commitments· 63,517 12,787 
(carlots)·· 
Av. open commitments 
per month 
(carlots) 2,443 1,162 
Deliveries·"· 
(carlots) 1,939 1,580 
Av. deliveries per 
month (carlots) 75 143 
% of open commitments 
settled by delivery 
(carlots) 3.05 12.36 
Group III 
3/72 
through 
6/73 
19,920 
1,245 
2,079 
123 
10.43 
. For the next month's contract at end of last business day preceding the 
delivery month. 
.. One carlot is 600 cases for Group I, 700 cases for Group II and 750 cases for 
Group III. 
••• These totals include only original cars delivered, not the redeliveries per-
mitted in Group I and II. 
Source: CEA and survey data. 
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The average number of delivery months that the contract was in existence 
was 26 months for group one procedure, 11 months for group two procedure, 
and 16 months for group three through June30, 1973 when this procedure was 
still in effect. The average number of deliveries per month has increased from 
75 for Group one and at the present time has averaged 123 carlots per month 
for group three for the 16 months of the contract to June 30, 1973. This is the 
productfon from one and three-fourths to two million hens for a 30 day month. 
It is also noted at the present time that deliveries are used to satisfy 10 percent 
of the contracts that were open at the beginning of the delivery month . 
• Futures a market for surplus eggs. In futures trading , 10 percent of the 
current month contract settled by delivery is considered relatively high, 
particularly when the nature of shell eggs is considered a fresh, perishable 
commodity that declines in quality with time. The eggs in the group one period 
could be delivered at over 50 approved cold storage warehouses located in all 
parts of the country. In group three the eggs could be delivered at over 125 
approved egg packing plants. In group two, delivery was permitted at either 
the warehouses or the approved egg packing plants. The quality specifica-
tions of eggs delivered on the futures contract is essentially that of U.S. Grade 
A large eggs. So in packing for delivery the packing plant placed cartonable 
eggs in cases loose rather than in cartons. Egg industry knowledge of 
warehouse storage, the convenience of storage in warehouses and later the 
greater ease of delivery from the packing plant led to a large number of 
deliveries as egg packers utilized the futures to merchandise surplus, loose, 
grade A large eggs. This information was secured through interviews with 
members of the industry who had delivered eggs or had received delivery of 
eggs. The egg futures provides a market for loose eggs at a time when moving 
loose eggs is a problem . 
• Changes in egg marketing. It is well to back up a bit to note what has been 
happening in egg marketing. In the last 15 years, there has been a continual 
movement of the egg packing plants from termi nal market assembly centers to 
the production sites. Economic reasons involved included less labor cost, 
lower general overhead cost, a supply of eggs close at hand, opportunities to 
divert undergrade eggs to other uses more readily and the operation of grad-
ing plants by those interested in production. 
It is estimated that about 50 percent of all eggs are cartoned and go to the 
retail store. About 15 percent are sold to the institutional users and most of 
these are in the graded, loose form. The only other user of graded, loose eggs 
is the military and they only use about one percent of the total production.3 
As egg marketing is becoming more structured the opportunity to market sur-
plus, graded, loose eggs has become quite limited. Buyers and sellers have 
informal agreements on volume with paying price being in relation to some 
reporting or recorded price. Sellers like to know where the eggs are going and 
buyers like to know from whom they are getting eggs. This involves quality and 
volume. Many buyers have more confidence in quality from a regular source. 
Sellers have more confidence in the willingness and ability of the regular 
buyers to pay. 
3Rogers, George B. , Voss, Leonard A., Readings on Egg Pricing, College of Agriculture, 
University of Missouri-Columbia, 1971 , p. 136. 
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Most eggs move from packing plants in cartons. Therefore when a packer 
has a surplus he cannot put in cartons, which carry a brand or retail store 
name, he tries to sell loose, graded eggs in the trade and the assumption (a 
valid one) is that such a seller is surplus. Packers report it frequently requires a 
number of telephone calls to sell such surplus eggs. Most packers prefer not to 
have it known that they have extra eggs as buyers try to take advantage of this. 
Selling through the futures market makes it possible to remain anonymous to a 
certain degree. The price is known and the eggs will be outofthe plant in three 
days on the in-plant delivery procedure. So many packers are willing to market 
eggs through short futures sales. They do not seem to worry about who gets 
the eggs. As one of the egg packers pointed out, delivering eggs through the 
futures contract as a method of sale is truly selling eggs the "lazy" way. A 
legitimate market consists of a buyer and seller negotiating where the seller 
wishes to sell and the buyer wants the product. 
• Egg quality decline influences the use of delivered eggs. Eggs decline in 
quality with time so the receiver does not have a constant quality value. So 
unless he has use for the eggs he must dispose of them soon. An unstable 
product in the hands of someone who has no need for it is a distressed 
product. Eggs delivered to someone who does not need them or have use for 
them are truly a distressed product. Added to this is the future contract 
requirement currently in effect that the eggs must be moved within three 
days, probably one ortwo days after the receiverfinds out he has eggs, or pay a 
high charge for leaving them atthe delivery point. So there is the situation of a 
distressed product at some distant location, usually in a production area. 
If the eggs are received by an industry member he may use his industry 
contacts to get them transported to where he wants them or to get them sold. 
However, if sold, they need to move at distressed product prices in orderto get 
them moved quickly. If the eggs are received by a non-industry member, he 
usually relies on a broker to get them sold for him and again the eggs move at 
distressed prices. Interviews -indicate that the sale of these eggs are at five to 
twelve cents a dozen below the price for a similar pack and quality in the area. 
This is particularly true in periods of surplus. 
There are numerous interview reports that packers deliver eggs in the 
hopes of buying them back at three to eight cents or more below the local 
prices. They are often successful, according to reports. The buyers are then in 
a position to discount the eggs on a carton sale to retailers. Breakers are 
reported to buy back or buy delivered eggs to lower the cost of the raw 
materials going to the dried egg mixes on government contracts. Actually, the 
delivered eggs are usually bought at or below good quality breaking egg price 
levels . 
• Breakers a market for delivered eggs. The present technology of breaking 
machines permits use of variable size eggs to be broken. Only reasonably 
clean eggs are all that is necessary as they go through a washer ahead of the 
breaking machines. Therefore the breakers are not interested in paying for the 
washing, sizing, and grading service which has already been added to the 
graded and sized loose eggs. It is estimated by some traders that 80 to 90 
percent of all delivered eggs end up being bought for egg breaking stock. 
Someone may point out that when eggs are in short supply the delivered eggs 
may not move to the breaki ng plant, however, it must be remem bered that if the 
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egg futures is used as a market for surplus, loose eggs then there will be very 
few deliveries at a time when there is no surplus. The packers will not have 
surplus eggs. Also, a packer who needs eggs to carton will buy at a sharply 
discounted price, as in practice packing line technology is such, and packers 
confidence is such, that the eggs are put through the grading and cartoning 
line like nest run eggs . 
• Egg futures prices below cash In delivery month. The large number of 
deliveries has a strong tendency to drive the smaller speculators out of the 
market for the delivery month contract as they do not wish to take the risk of 
receiving eggs. Also, there is evidence that the professional traders now are 
taking the short side of the market. These two factors seem to be responsible 
for the tendency of egg futures prices to be considerably below the cash prices 
in the current month. When the futures price in the current month does not 
equal the cash price or come reasonably close to it, the hedging function is 
distorted. This relatively low futures price is an advantage for the short hedger 
but a disadvantage for the long hedger. All parties are best served when the 
cash and futures prices come together. When deliveries were not so frequent 
the futures price tended to be above the cash price which is also a disruptive 
hedging situation as this favors the long hedger and causes problems for the 
short hedger. 
The futures contract is not likely to function properly when it is used to 
merchandise eggs. A primary function of a futures contract is to shift price risk 
to speculators who are willing to assume the risk in hopes of financial gain. 
When a contract is used to merchandise eggs the risk shifting device is 
partially abrogated as long time hedging does not take place. Many industry 
members now think of the shell egg futures as providing market protection not 
price protection. Those who want to deliver will hold a contract for only a short 
time. Many speculators lose confidence in the contract and deliveries tend to 
cause them to sell before the delivery month or early in the delivery month. The 
average speculator is willing to stay in the market in the current month and 
likes to do so but not when the contract is stacked in favor of the industry 
shorts and the speculator is likely to get eggs. As a result, very low relative 
volume is traded in the current month. 
The marketing system operates most effectively and efficiently particularly 
on perishable commodities when the product flows smoothly from the pro-
ducer or seller to the buyer. When eggs are delivered on the futures contract, 
the channel is disrupted and lengthened so marketing costs increase. Delivery 
on the futures market brings about a dislocation of supplies . 
• Sale of delivered eggs affects cash egg prices. As far as marketing is 
concerned, the biggest impact of delivery of large quantities of eggs on the 
futures market occurs on the pricing system and the prices for eggs. When 
eggs are received by a non-industry member or by an industry member at a 
distant location, the eggs are likely to sell at distressed prices. The sale of 100 
to 300 or more cars of eggs delivered in many months and an average of 123 
cars over the sixteen month period since the current delivery rules have been 
used has a depressing effect upon egg prices. The price at which these eggs 
sell for is used as leverage by people in the industry to buy other eggs at a lower 
price. Also the sale price of delivered eggs gets into the price reporting system. 
The circumstances of the sale become lost, but not the price, so lower prices 
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are reported. Also the delivery month futures prices are below cash prices. 
This has a lowering effect on the reported prices of eggs. 
It is generally accepted by economists that the buyers have more market 
power than the sellers in the egg industry. Therefore the distressed prices for 
eggs put another tool into the hands of the buyers who have market power. In 
periods of the earlier delivery procedure, the large traders tended to be on the 
long side of the market and the futu res price in the delivery month tended to be 
above the cash market. This placed an advantage into the hands of the sellers 
but since they do not have the market power it did not become as potentially 
price disruptive as when the tool is placed in the hands of those who have the 
market power. 
The large number of deliveries also is another tool for those who wish to 
attempt to manipulate prices . 
• Effect of deliveries on pricing. It is so common that it is almost a truism 
that when there are many deliveries against the futures contract that the 
commodity futures price tends to decline. This is particularly observable in the 
fresh shell egg contract where as the number of deliveries stepped up, the 
futures price during the current month tended to always be under the cash 
price. This is an abnormal situation. The normal situation is that the futures 
price should be slightly higher than the cash price because of the cost and 
inconvenience of delivering the commodity. The thinking here is that the short 
would rather pay a slight premium in orderto get his contract offset rather than 
go to the expense and inconvenience of delivering the commodity. 
As the futures price in the current month declines, it has been observed that 
there is often a tendency forthe cash price to follow this down to some degree. 
In months of large surplus, the effect of the lower futures price is even greater 
than in months when the surplus is not quite so large. The combination of the 
lower futures prices plus the receipt of the commodity by many longs who 
probably do not have need for the commodity, tend to lower cash prices. Both 
the lower futures prices in the current month and the slightly lower cash prices 
tend to get reported into the price reporting mechanism and the end result is 
that it has a tendency to lower the cash prices. 
This is particularly true when the futures prices tend to be lower than the 
cash price in the current month and the many deliveries are selling at dis-
counted prices as the buyers of agricultural commodities, in the form in which 
they are traded in futures contracts, tend to have much more market power 
than the sellers of these commodities. Therefore, they will and can use this 
opportunity to lower futures prices and some low cash price sales to lower the 
general price level of the commodity. In other words, due to the market power 
and the pricing situation that exists because of the many deliveries the net 
effect is to have a downward push on prices at this level. Also because these 
prices tend to representthe raw agricultural commodities there is an impact all 
the way along the line to the finished product. 
• Traders flee from deliveries. There is a tendency to flee from deliveries. 
When many deliveries are being made, it is quite common to note the longs 
taking cover by selling to avoid having to take delivery. This is particularly 
true with the commodities that are unstable such as live animals or those 
in which there is a gradual , noticeable quality deterioration over time such 
as in fresh shell eggs. It is in these commodities that the flight from delivery 
is the greatest. 
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There is also a flight from delivery on the part of the shorts if it is believed, in 
the market that, some longs are standing for delivery. Then shorts often buy 
back their contract quickly to avoid having to make deliveries. This, of course, 
has a price increasing effect on the futures market. This is likely to occur in 
times of strong prices for the commodity. 
The tendency for flight from delivery is becoming greater as the procure-
ment in many commodities, particularly the unstable and perishable com-
modities, is becoming more structured. Therefore, the delivery has to be made 
out of the normal structured procurement channel and is frequently received 
out of the normal structured procurement channel. 
• Reduction of the number of deliveries. The red uction of many deliveries 
on the futures contract is normally accomplished by making the rules for 
delivery more restrictive and therefore more ditficu lt so that the shorts do not 
look upon the futures contract as another way of merchandising their product. 
If the rules of delivery are such that the delivery is easily accomplished, there is 
a flight from delivery on the part of the longs, and the relaxed rules of delivery 
are responsible for many deliveries in the commodity. On the other hand, if 
there are severe restrictions in the rules that make delivery undesirable or 
difficult, the shorts tend to flee from delivery and there may be times when the 
longs stand for delivery as a manipu lative effort. Then the shorts attempt to buy 
back their contracts ifthey do not wish to deliver and will bid the prices higher, 
which is usually the object of the manipulation. The type of manipulation 
achieved by standing for delivery is probably more easily recognized. 
It can be argued that the standing for delivery under restrictive delivery 
situation is the exact counterpart of too many deliveries driving price down. 
The hypothesis is advanced that the impact on cash prices is probably not as 
great when futures prices are on the upside than when they are on the 
downside. There is more a tendency to disregard the futures prices when 
they are higher than cash prices as the market power is with the buyers. They 
are given much more consideration when they are below the current cash 
price. In the situation of the longs forcing the delivery and having an upward 
push on futures prices the sale of the delivered product at somewhat of a 
distressed price is balanced by the higher futures price. In other words, the 
negotiating impact of low futures prices on the cash price is much greater than 
the negotiating impact of high futures prices on the cash price. 
It also might be well to point out that the prices for agricultural com-
modities may tend to be on the low side because of the market power situation 
therefore the upward push of the higher futures prices is beneficial. 
Current experience indicates that probably there is more and greater ma-
nipulative effort when deliveries are scarce but solution to this is not make 
more deliveries and thereby ruin the purpose of the futures market which is 
hedging and price protection but the remedy is much closer surveillance in an 
effort to control this type of manipulative effort. 
Initial Deliveries on Some Major Futures Contracts 
As much has been said in this publication relating to the number of de-
liveries under the fresh shell egg futures contracts, it might be well to devote 
some space to the number of deliveries under other major futures contracts, 
both from the standpoint of determining whether the excessive number of 
deliveries is a problem only in fresh shell egg futures contracts or if it is 
common to other contracts and also for the purpose of getting a general 
perspective. 10 
A comparison with other futures contract initial deliveries does not neces-
sarily prove that there are no problems in any of the commodities if all de-
liveries run relatively the same percentage of the number of open contracts at 
the end of the last trading day preceding the contract month. 
There is no convenient way of establishing a benchmark for the number of 
deliveries in comparison to the number of contracts traded. One that is fre-
quently used is to calculate the percent the deliveries are of the open 
commitments at the end of the last trading day preceding the delivery month. 
Another method that can be used is to determine the comparison percent that 
the deliveries are of the total number of contracts traded during the life of the 
contract. Both of these leave something to be desired but are used in absence 
of any better comparison. 
In relating deliveries to the number of open commitments at the beginn ing 
of the month, this does not take into account the fact that the number of open 
commitments may rise during delivery month of trading so that the number of 
deliveries can conceivably exceed the number of contracts open at the begin-
ning of the month. A comparison to the number of contracts traded during 
the life of the contract is also fraught with problems because there often is a 
period of considerable high volume trading some months preceding the 
delivery months. Also some contracts are open longer than others and con-
tracts for some months are normally traded more than others . 
• Discussion of specific commodity deliveries. In Table 2 is given the 
information of futures contract deliveries based on the number of open com-
mitments at the end of the last trading day prior to the delivery month . These 
are given for the contracts that were traded from the beginning of 1971 
through mid 1973. The number of contracts traded for the various com-
modities differs because they have differing number of contracts open during 
the year. The highest number, of course, is shell eggs, which had a contract 
open every month during this period. The average open commitments is the 
total open commitments at the beginning of the trading of the contract month 
divided by the number of contracts. The number of deliveries is the number of 
initial deliveries. Some contracts have a redelivery provision whereby the 
receiver merely sells a contract short and redelivers the commodity within the 
limited time, usually not over two days. 
The commodities are grouped by the contract market where the contracts 
are traded. It includes only those contracts which are regulated by the Com-
modity Exchange Authority. It will be noted that among the unstable com-
modities which are all those that are listed under the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, shell eggs has the highest percent settled by delivery. Live beef 
cattle and live hogs are quite low and frozen pork bellies is below eggs. The 
high month in number of deliveries is given in Table 2 to give some ideas of the 
column of the commodity that is taken through the longer marketing channel 
via delivery in the high month. 
This may represent an added marketing cost as delivery through the fu-
tures adds to the length of the marketing channel. The storable commodities, 
wh ich are listed in the remainder of the table, show a varying percent of the 
contracts settled by delivery with wheat at the Minneapolis Grain Exchange at 
31.3% being the high. The percentage is lower for contracts which are traded 
in a relatively heavy volume, although there were a high number of cars de-
livered in the high month for each of the contracts. 
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Table 2 
Initial Futures Contract Deliveries 
1971 through mid-1973 
CONTRACTS 
% open Number 
contracts in high 
Av. open Av. no. settled by month of 
Commodity Number Committment del iveries del ivery delivery 
Chicago Merchantile Exchange 
Shell Eggs 31 1167 131 11.2 357 
Live hogs 17 2268 74 3.2 155 
Frozen Pork Bellies 14 3578 249 7.0 557 
Live Beef Cattle 14 5803 177 3.0 700 
Chicago Board of Trade 
Corn 13 9609 1013 10.5 2084 
Oats 12 399 98 24.6 184 
Soybeans 17 7966 1131 14.2 2124 
Wheat 13 2895 160 5.5 427 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange 
Wheat 13 461 144 31 .3 416 
Kansas City Board of Trade 
Wheat 13 1994 353 17.7 1760 
Source: Commodity Exchange Authority reports . 
• Deliveries of unstable commodities disrupt the marketing channel. It 
can be argued that delivery of storable grain on the futures contract is not the 
disruption in the marketing channel that exists with the unstable commodities, 
as grains are usually stored in a warehouse somewhere anyway and the 
change of ownership consists merely of delivery of a warehouse receipt. The 
grain does not have to be moved but can be left there at the location and then 
move on into the marketing channel. There may be an extra ownership in-
volved, but physically the grain is not moved and the movement of the com-
modity in the marketing channel is not disturbed. This is not true of the 
commod ities listed on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Table 2, as all of 
these commodities, with the possible exception of frozen pork bellies, must 
be moved from the delivery point by the receiver. 
The January 1973 soybean futures contract had 1,014 contracts open at the 
beginning of delivery month but there were 1,296 contracts settled by delivery 
or 128.3% of the contracts open. This was no doubt due to considerable 
trading during the delivery month in that contract and individuals purchasing 
contracts and standing for delivery. It is entirely possible that a special price 
situation created this situation where the longs thought the ownership of 
soybeans in a rising market would provide them with some financial gains. 
Table 2 emphasizes that there are considerable deliveries on the futures 
contract and again emphasizes that it would be desirable if the number of 
deliveries were reduced so the potential for disruption of the marketing chan-
nel and the added cost of marketing were held at a minimum and still provide a 
viable futures contract for the purpose of shifting price risk. 
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Specific I nformation on Shell Egg Deliveries 
From information made available by the Commodity Exchange Authority, 
the author conducted personal interviews with half of the individuals involved 
in the initial delivery or ultimate receipt of eggs delivered during the last half of 
1970. During this time there were 554 cars of initial deliveries and of these 
about half, 229, were redelivered one or more times during the trading period. 
The interviews were almost entirely with those making initial deliveries or 
being ultimate receivers of cars of eggs. 
As is noted from Table 3 the number of individuals or firms involved in the 
six month delivery period was low, only 202. The redelivery information is for 
individuals making the first redelivery only; information was not obtained on 
subsequent redeliveries. When the 75 involved in redelivery only was sub-
tracted from the 292 total, 127 remained. 
There were less involved in delivery, 64, than in receiving, 70. Of the 64 
making delivery there were 55 who only delivered. Of the 70 who received eggs 
44 were receivers only. A large portion of those who redelivered were 
involved in redelivery only. 
Table 3 
Fresh Shell Egg Deliveries, 
Individuals or Firms 
July 1 - December 31, 1970 
Individuals or Firms 202 
Deliverers 64 
Deliverers only 55 
Receivers 70 
Receivers only 44 
Redeliverers· 99 
Redeliverers only· 75 
"Information obtained was on first re-
delivery only. Those who redelivered 
all eggs received were classified as re-
deliverers only. Those classified as re-
ceivers did not redeliver the eggs. 
Source: Survey data. 
From the total column on Table 4 it is apparent that those involved in the 
initial delivery or as Ultimate receivers did notchangetheir position as longs or 
shorts during the six month period. There were only seven involved in both 
delivery and receiving during the six months time . 
• Industry vs non-industry members involved in delivery. The division 
between egg industry and non-egg industry members was made on the basis 
of information from brokers and the author's knowledge. As might be ex-
pected the non-industry members made few deliveries, only four were in-
volved, but 33 were receivers. Over half of those redelivering were non-
industry members. The number of non-egg industry members was probably 
biased low as brokers were classified as members of the industry since they 
had knowledge of the egg industry. In the interviews it was determined that 
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Table 4 
Individuals or Firms Involved in 
Fresh Shell Egg Deliveries 
July 1 - December 31, 1970 
Deliverers only 
Receivers only 
Redeliveries only 
Deliverers and receivers 
Deliverers, redeliverers, and receivers 
Deliverers and redeliverers 
Receivers and redeliverers 
Minus redeliverers only 
Source: Survey data 
Total 
Industry 
51 
20 
32 
4 
3 
2 
10 
122 
90 
Non-egg 
industry 
4 
24 
43 
9 
80 
37 
Total 
55 
44 
75 
4 
3 
2 
19 
202 
127 
some were handling clients' accounts in the brokerage firm name and those 
clients were usually non-industry speculators . 
• Location of those involved in deliveries. There were traders from 30 
states, Canada and Mexico, involved in the delivery, first redelivery or ultimate 
receipt of eggs. Traders in four states made only redeliveries. Nine states were 
the location of only one delivereror receiver while five states had only two. The 
five leading states were the location of 50 percent of the traders. These were 
California, Illinois, Texas, Arkansas and Minnesota. The trader locations were 
in major production states or related to the location of the futures trading 
(Chicago). Traders interviewed stated thatthe delivery was a method of selling 
eggs. This would account for many traders being located in the egg produc-
tion areas. Also some industry members, notably egg breakers, used the 
futures to secure supplies. Breakers are located in production areas . 
• Concentration of involvement In delivery. There were 15 traders who 
delivered 10 or more cars of eggs and eight were the final receivers of 10 or 
more cars. The largest involvement was 145 cars, all received in September, 
1970, about 10 percent of the 554 cars delivered. Six deliverers accounted for 
53 percent of the delivered cars. Combined date for delivery and final receiving 
shows that 50 percent of the 127 traders were involved with on ly one or two 
cars of shell eggs. This indicates that relatively few people were involved in the 
delivery and ultimate receiving of the 554 cars of eggs delivered during the last 
six months of 1970. 
Three traders made 38 percent of all deliveries during the six month period. 
There were four traders who were the ultimate receivers of 33 percent of all the 
deliveries. Two breakers were large deliverers and receivers being second and 
third highest in deliveries and third and fourth highest as final receivers, each 
accounting for about 10 percent of the transactions. It would seem that any 
trader delivering or being the final receiver of these volumes of eggs had for 
some reason not made an effort to offset his futures position in the market. 
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• Length of time contracts were held. Information on the length of time the 
short contracts were held before delivery or long contracts before receiving 
eggs was available on 553 of the 554 initial deliveries and 781 of the 783 
contracts on which eggs were received. The latter total is higher as it included 
deliveries that were later redelivered. 
Eleven percent of the sh ort contracts were held fou r calendar days or less. 
(Table 5) Trading days held were not calculated . The record shows 14 of 553 
deliveries made the same day the short sale was made while eggs were 
received on the long purchase day for 11 of the 781 contracts. The number of 
short contracts held less than 10 days were 37 percent of the total while 66 
percent were held less than 20 days before delivery. In contrast, 30 percent of 
the long contracts were held less than 20 days before the eggs were received. 
This table verifies interview information, namely that many industry members 
considered the futures as a market for eggs. 
The high number of deliveries before and after trading closed held for less 
than 20 days indicates deliberate planning by many shorts to deliver eggs. The 
high number of deliveries after trading closed on contracts held five to nine 
days could result from packing plants selling short priorto closing of trading in 
orderto be able to sell eggs through the futures during the approximate 10day 
period of no trading at the end of each month. The oldest short contract was 
held 283 days before delivery and the oldest long contract had been in exis-
tence 251 days when the eggs were received . 
Table 5 
Calendar Days Contract Was Held Before Delivering 
or Receiving Eggs-Fresh Shell Egg Futures 
Contracts, July 1-December 31, 1970 
Before Delivering Eggs Before Receiving Eggs 
Trading Accumul. Trading Accumul. 
Days open closed Tot. % # % open closed Tot. % # % 
0-4 48 - 14 62 11 62 11 14 - 15 29 4 29 4 
5-9 63 - 73 141 26 203 37 38 - 18 56 7 85 11 
10-19 90 - 71 161 29 364 66 71 - 81 152 19 237 30 
10-39 36 - 31 67 12 431 78 130 - 173 303 39 540 69 
40-79 21 - 23 44 8 475 86 165 - 30 195 25 735 94 
80-159 30 - 6 36 6 511 92 29 - 0 29 4 764 98 
160-284 20 - 22 42 8 553 100 17- 0 17 2 781 100 
Source: Survey Data 
• Contracts favor the shorts. Interviews with industry members and trad-
ers and observations indicate that the present trading rules overwhelmingly 
favored the shorts. The price lowering impact from large traders who now 
obviously take the short side of the market often results in a current price 
below the cash price. This induces producer interests to take large long 
positions in some months for the purpose of trying to influence cash prices 
upward through increasing current futures prices. 
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There has been a tendency for a heavy volume of delivery in the first few 
days of the month. Some traders attribute much of this early month delivery 
volume to the redelivery eggs delivered the previous month. They say this 
method is used to dispose of unwanted eggs received from the previous month 
futures delivery and to sell delivered eggs purchased at a sharp discount. 
• Recommendations. Recommendations are for considerations of 
changes that hopefully would improve the contract which was in effect in July, 
1973. The basis for these recommendations is information from interviews 
with traders, research schedules, egg industry members, and observations by 
the author based upon knowledge of the egg industry. 
1. Reduce the number of deliveries. Red uction in the number of deliveries will 
help restore the traditional price risk shifting function of futures trading. It 
does not seem that a market risk shifting function and a price risk shifting 
function are compatible. Markets are well organized and efficient and 
marketing through the futures is not a part of that marketing channel. The 
speculator has indicated by his actions that he is willing to take the 
price risk but his actions have shown that he is not willing to be a part of 
futu res that fu nction to shift market risk. Deliveries shou Id be the th reat that 
provides stability to the futures contract, in regard to compliance and 
cash-futures price relationships. The delivery of an unstable produ.ct pre-
sents special problems as the receiver has the time constraint operating 
that reduces the value of the product. If the quality were stable, such as in 
grains, he could dispose of the delivery at his convenience. Perishable 
products on the normal marketing channel usually become distressed 
products with a loss in operational pricing efficiency in the marketing 
process. The surplus at egg packing plants exists as loose graded eggs, as 
the markets for loose graded eggs have declined and are thin, particularly 
in the time of surplus. It is only natural that egg packers would seize on this 
opportunity to sell eggs through the futures. Therefore to reduce the 
number of deliveries on it is necessary to have some delivery restraints and 
rules. If trading in the fresh shell egg futures contract is for the purpose of 
ultimate delivery there will be a sharp reduction of trading when the 
general surplus does not exist. The hedging function is a more stable basis 
for futures trading. 
2. Require the delivery of U.S. Nest Run 20 percent AA quality eggs with the 
average net weight per case of 48 to 52 pounds. Nest run eggs are those 
eggs which are the beginning phase of movement through the marketing 
channel. Commercial flocks are now generally large and the eggs are from 
hens of uniform age and breeding. Such flocks produce relatively uniform 
eggs. The Nest Run grade makes it possible to trade on size and quality 
without undue effort and expense of initial grading, sizing, and packaging 
in bulk form to be followed by another rehandling by the receiver prior to 
final cartoning. This grade of eggs will be satisfactory for grading and 
cartoning or for use by egg breakers. The breakers wash all eggs just ahead 
of the breaking machine and do not need to size or grade fresh eggs. 
Therefore the eggs will be equally valuable for grading to carton or for 
breaking stock. It is reasonable to expect that breakers and grading plants 
would be willing to pay nearthe going price for nest run grade for delivered 
eggs. This would avoid some of the present price depressing effect of the 
sale of futures delivered eggs. 
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There should be no premium for eggs averaging excess of 52 pounds, 
but weighing from 43 to 48 pounds per case should be acceptable with a 
discount of a specific amount per dozen for each half pound by which the 
average weight per case falls below 48 pounds. 
3. Delivery by shipping certificate. The shipping cert ificate obligates the issu-
ing shipper to deliver a load of eggs from a plant upon demand of the 
certificate owner. The shipping certificate wou ld give a considerable de-
gree of flexibility to the long trader. If he does not want the eggs he may sell 
the certificate direct or through a channel established by the exchange. 
There should be a daily carrying charge for holding the certificate. There 
should be some restrictions on how long the certificate can be held and it 
should be required that the eggs be delivered during the delivery month. 
4. Shipment of eggs by the seller. Since eggs are often delivered from isolated 
packing plants located in the production areas, the shipper should be 
required to provide the transportation to the destination and be reimbursed 
by the receiver for the shipping cost not to exceed a set amount for each 
unit of distance shipped . 
5. Inspection at destination. Eggs shipped should be required to meet con-
tract specifications upon arrival at the shipping destination. A USDA 
grader should make the inspection. The receiver should make the inspec-
tion request and the shipper should have the right to request an appeal 
inspection. Payment should be shared between the shipper and receiver. 
Provision should be made that the inspection is not required to accept the 
eggs. 
The common practice in the industry is for eggs to be inspected or 
approved upon receipt. Considerable data shows that if eggs are properly 
packed and shipped the loss in quality due to shipping is very small or 
almost negl igible. 
6. Deliver eggs F. O. B. delivery point. The delivery of eggs F. O. B. delivery 
point would mean that the fre ight allowances would be removed. There was 
an economic justification for freight allowances based on Chicago delivery 
as most eggs were delivered from the midwest and tended to move to or 
through Chicago. This is no longer true. There are many concentrated 
production areas in the United States and eggs tend to move in many 
directions from all points. In the interviews it was determined that there 
were many instances where eggs in the southeast moved to Texas, eggs 
from California went to cities in the mountain states, and in most cases the 
receiver was closer to the delivery point than he was to Chicago. It is 
difficult to justify why a chance location of the deliverer or the receiver 
should provide an economic advantage or disadvantage through the trans-
portation allowances. 
7. Require all deliveries to be made in new cases. It is quite common for buyers 
to specify that eggs be delivered in new cases. This procedure would insure 
that the eggs are received in good cases. It would also help prevent the 
redelivery of the same eggs as it is some added expense to recase the eggs 
to redeliver in new cases. 
8. Simplify the paper work associated with delivery payments. Traders who 
have made only a few deliveries or received only a few cars of eggs often 
complain about the confusing papers they received in connection with the 
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settlement of the contract. Examination shows that these papers are quite 
extensive. They relate to calculations based on the settlement price which 
is not very well understood in the field. Papers sent to the trader should 
show the rate per dozen, total price, commission involved and any other 
charges and the net amount. The other papers should be kept at the 
clearing house. 
-~ 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange headquarters and trading facilities building. 
Summary 
The economic justifications for futures trading in agricultural commodities 
is to shift the risk of adverse price changes for the hedger. The speculator 
provides liquidity and takes the risk in return for the opportunity for financial 
gain from price changes. The delivery provision is included as the contract is 
an agreement to provide the commodity or accept the commodity if the 
contract is retained beyond a specified date. 
The purpose of a future therefore is not to buy or sell the commodity. The 
delivery of a commodity is usually outside the normal marketing channel and 
to someone who may have an adequate supply or someone who does not deal 
in the commodity. In either case the marketing channel is either disrupted or 
lengthened, either of which is inefficient, adds to marketing costs and may 
have a cash price decreasing effect. 
The fresh shell egg contract is an example of delivery to dispose of surplus 
eggs. The contract in effect in 1973 provided for the delivery of fresh, graded, 
loose packed shell eggs at egg packing plants. The marketing procedure now 
is such that the surplus of fresh, graded shell eggs is difficult to dispose of by 
packing plants. From March, 1972 through June, 1973 shell egg deliveries 
18 
averaged 123 carlots per month, equivalent to the production from 2 million 
hens for a 30 day period. Ten and four tenths percent of the contracts open at 
the beginning of the delivery month were settled by delivery. Shell eggs are an 
unstable commodity as quality declines with age so the receiver does not have 
a constant quality value. An unstable product in the hands of someone who 
has no need for it is a distressed product. Shell eggs delivered at the packing 
plant had to be removed within three days or a penalty was incurred. It was 
determined from interviews that receivers frequently sold eggs to a breaker or 
back to the packer at three to eight cents discount below local prices. There 
were numerous reports of packers delivering eggs in hopes of buying them 
back at such discounts, with good success. 
These sales had a price decreasing effect in cash egg prices as the sales 
without the circumstances got into the cash egg price reporting system. It was 
estimated that 80 to 90 percent of all delivered eggs ended up being used as 
breaking stock which meant they-were bought at breaker stock prices not at 
loose, graded egg values. The large number of deliveries drives many 
speculators out of the futures market in the delivery month as theydo not want 
to take the risk of receiving eggs. Studies also revealed that the professional 
traders were taking the short side of the market. Those factors seem to be 
responsible for the futures prices being considerably below the cash prices 
during the delivery month. When the cash and futures prices do not come 
together the hedging function of the futures market is distorted. 
Data from the commodity exchanges for regulated commodities shows 
that deliveries as a percent of open contracts at the beginning of the month 
settled by deliveries varied from 3.0 percent for live beef cattle to 31.3 percent 
for wheat at the Minneapolis Grain Exchange for 1971 through mid-1973. As a 
group, the deliveries of non-storable commodities were lower than for the 
storable grains and soybeans. However the unstable commodities deliveries 
are more disruptive to the marketing channel as the delivery of grain merely 
involves the exchange of a warehouse receipt. 
A detailed analysis was made of all fresh shell egg futures contract de-
liveries made during the last six months of 1970. There were 554 initial de-
liveries. There were only 127 individuals or firms involved. Of these, 57 deliv-
ered initial cars and 63 were ultimate receivers. There were 7 who both 
delivered and received during the 6 month period. Only 4 non-egg industry 
members were involved in delivery and 33 in receiving. In addition there were 
75 traders who were involved in the first redelivery only. 
There were traders from 26 states involved in delivery or receiving. Over 50 
percent of the traders were located in 5 states, California, Illinois, Texas, 
Arkansas and Minnesota. All of these states are major production areas except 
Illinois, the location of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Producers were 
selling eggs via futures. Egg breakers, also located in production areas, 
used the futures to secure breaking stock. 
There were 15 traders who received 10 or more cars and 8 were fi nal 
receivers of 10 or more cars. Three traders made 38 percent of all deliveries 
and six accounted for 53 percent. Four traders were the final receivers of 33 
percent of all deliveries in the six month period. 
Eleven percent of the short contracts were held 4 calendar days or less 
before delivery. Deliveries were made the same day ofthe short contract sale in 
2.5 percent of the cases. Contracts held less than 10 days were 37 percent and 
19 
66 percent less than 20 days before delivery. Only 1.4 percent of the longs 
received eggs the day they purchased contracts and only 30 percent of the 
contracts were held less than 20 days before receiving eggs. This verifies 
interview information, that many industry members consider futures as a way 
to sell eggs. The oldest short contract was held 283 days before delivery and 
the oldest long contract had been purchased 251 days before eggs were 
received . Industry members in interviews state overwhelmingly that the con-
tract favored the shorts. 
The tendency for heavy delivery volume the first days of the months was 
attributed by traders to redelivery of eggs delivered the previous month. 
Recommendations for improvement ofthe contract in effect on July 1,1973 
based on interviews, research sched u les and i nd ustry kn owledge of the author 
are: 
1. Reduce the number of deliveries. 
2. Require the delivery of US Nest Run grade eggs. 
3. Delivery by shipping certificate. 
4. Shipment of eggs to be made by the seller. 
5. Inspection at destination. 
6. Deliver eggs F.O.B. delivery point. 
7. Require all deliveries in new cases. 
8. Simplify the paper work associated with delivery settlement. 
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